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INTRODUCTION
“The EU membership strengthens the 
foundations of Finnish security. (…) 
As a small country we have to adapt, 
but we also wish to influence. That is 
the key question in our security policy 
currently.”
Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, 6.6.1995 
5Since Finland’s EU accession in 1995, the EU’s foreign, security and defence poli-cies have undergone significant devel-
opment. The first EU military operation was 
launched ten years ago (EUFOR Concordia in 
Macedonia, 2003), and since then operations 
have been carried out in DR Congo, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Chad and the Central Afri-
can Republic, and the coast of Somalia. Civil-
ian crisis management missions have taken 
place, for instance, in Macedonia, Palestin-
ian territories, Georgia, Aceh, Iraq, Sudan/
Darfur, DR Congo, and Kosovo. The EU bat-
tle groups were subsequently established in 
2007. The EU institutional structure manag-
ing these policies has also morphed, and now 
includes various units, committees, groups 
and planning cells.
The present paper analyzes the Europe-
anization of Finnish foreign and security 
policy, that is to say how Finland has adapted 
to the EU and its common foreign, security 
and defence policy. It also examines the ways 
in which Finland has tried to influence these 
European policies and what the outcome of 
these attempts has been. In other words, it 
discusses how the alleged key questions of 
Finnish security policy – “adaptation and 
the wish to influence” – have been realized. 
The main emphasis is placed on the tensions 
between non-alignment and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) on the 
one hand, and the impact of EU crisis man-
agement operations and battle groups on 
Finnish peacekeeping policy on the other.
A key argument is that participation in the 
EU’s foreign, security and defence policies 
has  played a significant role in a number of 
trans formations in the Finnish policy. These 
include changes for instance in the national 
position on the use of military force abroad 
(the rules of peace-keeping/military cri-
sis ma n agement), in the interpretation of 
 non-alignment, and the division of power 
among the primary national foreign policy 
decision-makers, namely the President and 
the Prime Minister/Council of State, and also 
the Parliament. Furthermore, it is suggested 
that participation in the EU’s foreign, securi-
ty and defence policies has come to represent 
not only a tool for responding to the changes 
in the international security environment, 
but also a means of self-identification for 
Finland. Consequently, EU membership has 
transformed the ideational roots of Finnish 
foreign and security policy.
Compared to the vast majority of other EU 
member states, the Finnish starting points 
for the Europeanization process are quite 
exceptional. Issues such as the tradition of 
neutrality policy, military non-alignment 
and non-NATO membership set Finland 
apart from the European mainstream. Con-
sequently, questions concerning the EU’s 
defence policy, for instance, have carried 
completely different weight in the Finnish 
debate compared to most of the other coun-
tries.
Indeed, there are a number of factors that 
increase Finland’s vulnerability to Euro-
peanization.  First of all, it is apparent that 
there has been a general responsive tendency 
– a pursuit of a place at the “core” of the 
Union – in Finland’s policy towards the EU. 
Particularly during the early years of Finnish 
membership, “the Finnish government was 
consciously trying to move from the periph-
ery to the core in order to maximize its polit-
ical influence”.1 This so-called Musterknabe 
attitude, being a model pupil, is often used to 
describe early Finnish EU policy.2 
Secondly, the Finnish emphasis on effi-
ciency in all EU actions has implied “open-
mindedness toward qualified majority voting 
in foreign and security policy even in mat-
ters other than implementation, and even 
toward application of flexibility or enhanced 
cooperation in security and defence policy 
cooperation”.3 Thirdly, Finnish public opin-
ion has been positive with regard to European 
security and defence policy. Raunio and Tii-
likainen note that “[w]hen it comes to ESDP, 
it would seem that Finnish people in general 
support it even more than the politicians”4. 
Security policy played a role in the Finnish 
population’s positive perceptions of the EU 
accession: many Finns expected that EU 
membership would increase Finland’s secu-
rity – military security included.5
1 Ojanen 2007, 36; also Antola 1999, Forsberg 2001, 
Tiilikainen 2006, 213.
2 See Mouritzen 1993.
3 Ranta & Vierros-Villeneuve 2006, 305-306.
4 Raunio & Tiilikainen 2003, 135.
5 Hokkanen 1996, 7.
6Since then, the public opinion surveys 
conducted by the Advisory Board of Defence 
Information have year on year (1996–2012) 
indicated that most Finns see EU member-
ship as the key factor contributing to the 
strengthening of Finnish security. The sur-
veys show that Finnish public opinion has 
remained positive towards the EU’s foreign, 
security and defence policies.6 Furthermore, 
a small-state aspect can be added to the list: 
the question of small states’ vulnerability to 
the impact of European integration, as well 
as the question of their ability to influence 
European policies are particularly relevant 
for Finland.
This paper is based on a doctoral thesis 
titled The Art of Adaptation: A Study on the 
Europeanization of Finland’s Foreign and 
Security Policy, University of Helsinki.7The 
findings and conclusions presented here 
are based on the analysis of key foreign and 
security policy documents: Government 
Reports on security and/or defence policy 
(1995, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2012) and 
related speeches by key decision-makers; 
legislative amendments or new laws (Gov-
ernment proposals) concerning foreign and 
security policy, and particularly participa-
tion in peacekeeping and crisis management 
operations (e.g. peacekeeping/military crisis 
management legislation of 1995, 2000, 2005, 
2006; decisions to place a military contingent 
on a high state of readiness as part of the EU’s 
battle group 2007, 2010); Government mate-
rial stemming from the national preparation 
for EU intergovernmental conferences, as 
well as reactions to the development of the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP).
In order to provide a richer picture of the 
national discourse, this material is supple-
ment ed with the related parliamentary 
 de bate (political discussion in the plenary 
sessions), and statements and reports by 
 the Par lia mentary Committees (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Defence Committee, 
Constitutional Law Committee and Grand 
Committee).
6 Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta 2012.
7 Palosaari 2011.
I 
NEUTRALITY AND ACCESSION TO THE EU
8Finland joined the European Union in the first wave of post-Cold War en-largement in 1995. All the applicants 
– including the neutral countries, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden – had to accept and 
be able to implement the Union’s common 
foreign and security policy. This criterion 
was implicitly aimed at the aforementioned 
neutral applicants. Before the accession, the 
Commission deemed that Finland’s policy of 
neutrality – “or what is left of it” as the re-
port put it – could pose problems for the Un-
ion: “in respect of the common foreign and 
security policy, the question arises to what 
extent Finland, which, as an armed neutral, 
has always laid great emphasis on the capa-
bility of defending the national territory, can 
fully share some of its objectives, such as the 
safeguarding of the independence and secu-
rity of the Union (Article J.4)”.8
During the accession negotiations, the 
Commission called for further confirmation 
and specific and binding assurances with re-
gard to Finland’s political commitment and 
legal capacity to fulfil the obligations of the 
common foreign and security policy. This 
was needed “in order to be satisfied that this 
would not hamper the possible evolution in 
time of a common European defence”.9 Even-
tually, Finland, together with the three other 
countries applying for EU membership at the 
same time (Sweden, Norway and Austria), is-
sued a declaration in which it committed to 
the CFSP without any national preconditions 
or constraints (Joint Declaration on Common 
Foreign and Security Policy 21.12.1993). The 
declaration is also included in the accession 
agreement. When Finland joined the EU, the 
official national interpretation was that Finn-
ish military non-alignment and the CFSP do 
not contradict each other.10
The dominant Finnish perception after ac-
cession was that the EU is a security commu-
nity where solidarity and reciprocity among 
the members strengthen the security of each. 
Yet, the role of the EU as a security policy ac-
tor on a practical level was regarded as rather 
limited and the significance attached to the 
CFSP and its instruments was modest. It was 
8 European Commission 1992, 22.
9 European Commission 1992, 23.
10 Government Report 1/1995, 39.
considered that in the building process of 
the new European security system, organi-
zations such as the OSCE, WEU and NATO 
play a more decisive role than the EU. Ac-
cording to Government Report 1/1995, the 
EU’s security policy significance to Finland 
actually depended on Finland’s own activity 
and contribution: the EU offered new oppor-
tunities to influence change in the security 
environment and its stability. EU member-
ship was regarded as a tool for both advanc-
ing national interests and contributing to the 
broader international security landscape.11 
When it came to military security, the Gov-
ernment noted that it remains Finland’s 
own responsibility but that EU member-
ship “will help Finland to repel any military 
threats and prevent attempts to exert politi-
cal pressure”12 – even without any particular 
military security clause in the EU treaties. 
This view was widely shared in the domestic 
debate as the following extract from a parlia-
mentary speech illustrates:
“Any actor threatening Finland has to take 
into consideration that Finland is in a union 
with a community of 350 million inhabitants 
and that the EU does not accept the intimi-
dation of any one of its member states.”13 
Although the EU accession called for a 
reinterpretation of neutrality/non-align-
ment, the deeper international transforma-
tion processes were the principal causes of 
the change in Finnish policy at that stage. 
The downgrading of neutrality had actually 
started as early as the beginning of the 1990s. 
After the end of the Cold War, the traditional 
neutrality between East and West had ceased 
to be an option. The commitment to the CFSP 
was chiefly seen as an instrument in imple-
menting the adaptation to the new interna-
tional security environment. Thus, despite 
the CFSP and the declared commitment to it, 
official documentation and domestic debate 
stressed non-alignment as a continuing key 
element of Finnish foreign and security pol-
icy. In a similar vein, the aspects of the CFSP 
11 Prime Minister Lipponen 6.6.1995, preliminary 
debate on the Government Report 1/1995; 
Government Report 1/1995, 40.
12 Government Report 1/1995, 39.
13 MP Ihamäki 6.6.1995, preliminary debate on 
Government Report 1/1995.
9that were regarded as most convenient from 
a national viewpoint were emphasized. The 
CFSP’s aims were seen to lie in general issues 
such as peace, security and the promotion of 
human rights. The Government underlined 
that the CFSP did not imply a need to alter 
bilateral relations, that the responsibility 
for defence would remain national, and that 
independent national decision-making was 
still possible.14
Thanks to the still embryonic state of the 
CFSP in the 1990s, it was possible to argue 
that the CFSP only complemented the na-
tional policy and did not come into conflict 
with it. This greatly reduced the urgency to 
radically Europeanize national foreign and 
security policy. Likewise, the parliamentary 
debates reveal no significant importance of 
the EU’s security institutions in the minds of 
national decision-makers. At that point, the 
idea of a common European defence policy, 
EU crisis management operations and bat-
tle groups seemed farfetched to Finns. EU 
membership and the supportive stance on 
the CFSP functioned as instruments to con-
vince the international community that the 
reorientation of Finnish foreign and security 
policy was genuine and permanent. Tellingly, 
in the parliamentary debate on Government 
Report 1/1995, many MPs underlined that the 
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union (the 
FCMA Treaty) no longer defined the interna-
tional role and identity of Finland. It was re-
placed by EU membership, European values, 
non-alignment and independent defence.15 
14 Government Report 2/1991, Government Report 
1/1995.
15 E.g. MP Penttilä, MP Salolainen 31.10.1995, follow-
up debate on Government Report 1/1995. 
II 
THE CFSP MEETS NON-ALIGNMENT
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In the late 1990s, the deepening integra-tion in the sphere of foreign and security policy challenged some of the key con-
cepts of Finland’s foreign and security policy. 
Considerable progress in terms of capacities 
and institutional build-up was made in EU 
foreign policy. The EU was given the com-
petence to deploy military resources in crisis 
management. The European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)16 was launched and 
the first steps were taken to enhance military 
capabilities for the purposes of the ESDP.
Consequently, there was a growing un-
derstanding that Finland had arrived at a 
crossroads and had to “choose whether it 
will follow the European mainstream in se-
curity or opt out partially or fully from the 
European security policy cooperation”.17 
Finland had to adopt a more consistent and 
committed stance on EU security and de-
fence policy and decide on the means by 
which it would participate in its develop-
ment. Furthermore, Finland was impelled to 
reconsider the compatibility of military non-
alignment and EU defence cooperation, since 
the question of the EU’s defence dimension 
was on the EU’s intergovernmental confer-
ence agenda in 1996. In addition, the Kosovo 
crisis, NATO and EU enlargements, and the 
rearrangement of NATO-Russia relations 
posed challenges to Finnish foreign and se-
curity policy-making.
The new European framework for foreign 
and security policy-making was increasingly 
taken on board. The next Government Report 
on security policy (titled “European Security 
Development and Finnish Defence”, 1997) 
focused more on Europe than on the general 
post-Cold War security environment. The 
significance of the EU for Finnish security 
policy was officially stated more explicitly 
than before. The three basic factors in Finnish 
security policy were presented as “military 
non-alliance, an independent defence and 
membership of the European Union”.18 The 
increased prominence given to the EU in Fin-
land’s security policy was also visible in that 
16 The ESDP was renamed the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty of Lisbon.
17 MP Kallis 17.3.1997, preliminary debate on 
Government Report 1/1997.
18 Government Report 1/1997, 47.
the rejection of neutrality in Finland’s foreign 
and security policy on the grounds of Fin-
land’s EU membership was expressed more 
clearly: “as a member of the EU, Finland can-
not be impartial in a conflict between the EU 
and a third party”.19 The Government stated 
that neutrality was not an appropriate term 
to define the Finnish policy. This was because 
as an active participant in the CFSP, Finland, 
together with the other EU member states, 
is jointly responsible for the status and secu-
rity of the EU. The Government announced 
that “Finland supports the strengthening of 
the EU’s effectiveness in foreign and secu-
rity policy capacity and is participating con-
structively in the development of the Union’s 
security and defence dimension”.20 Nation-
ally, this was justified by emphasizing that 
Finland can participate in CFSP development 
and its implementation without compromis-
ing military non-alignment. 
Yet, the Government’s position on the 
CFSP was criticized in the parliamentary 
debate. It was considered, for instance, that 
creating a crisis management capacity for the 
EU in practice means establishing an organi-
zation which can also implement common 
defence – which, in turn, was considered 
problematic for non-aligned Finland. There-
fore a typical critical conclusion was that 
“No military capacity of any kind should be 
created for the EU, not even in the sense of 
the so- called crisis management mentioned 
in the report”.21 Reacting to this, the Foreign 
Minister reminded parliament about “what 
has been agreed upon when Finland joined 
the EU” and how the Maastricht Treaty (and 
its Articles on the eventual framing of com-
mon defence) bind Finland. Referring to the 
lack of any opt-outs, the Foreign Minister 
noted that “the Maastricht Treaty has a to-
tally different status for Finland than for 
Denmark or the UK”.22 
19 Government Report 1/1997, 48.
20 Government Report 1/1997, 6.
21 MP Korkeaoja, 18.3.1997, preliminary debate on 
Government Report 1/1997.
22 Foreign Minister Halonen, 18.3.1997, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 1/1997. Denmark’s 
opt-outs concern EMU, the ESDP, Justice and Home 
Affairs and citizenship of the EU; the UK’s opt-outs 
concern EMU and the Schengen Agreement.
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This debate shows how the interplay be-
tween domestic and European expectations 
was increasing. As a result, merely adapting 
to the CFSP was complemented by growing 
efforts to influence the development of its 
defence dimension so that it would not pose 
problems for Finnish non-alignment.
Europeanization can actually occur in two 
directions: top-down national adaptation, 
and bottom-up national projection. In ad-
dition to the adaptation of national policies, 
the member states can promote and export 
nationally defined policy models, ideas, goals 
and interests to the EU level. This means that 
a member state can push for its national for-
eign policy goals to be adopted as EU goals or 
policies. If such “uploading” is successful, it 
might lead to the emergence of new policies 
or structures at the EU level.23 This aspect of 
Europeanization has been particularly visible 
in the Finnish case when EU defence policy 
has been on the agenda at EU Intergovern-
mental Conferences. As will be explained 
below, Finland has invoked its non-align-
ment, joined forces with other neutral or 
non-aligned EU member states, and made 
attempts to influence the direction of EU de-
fence policy so as not to compromise its sta-
tus as a militarily non-aligned country. The 
outcomes of Finland’s attempts to project its 
national goals have varied, however.
23 Wong 2006; Palosaari 2011, 34.
III 
EU DEFENCE POLICY AND MILITARY 
NON-ALIGNMENT
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The reconfiguration of the relationship between the EU and WEU was on the EU agenda in the late 1990s, and France, 
Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy and 
Spain proposed a full merger of these organi-
zations. This would have meant importing 
the WEU security guarantee clause into the 
EU treaties. Moreover, it was proposed that 
the forthcoming Amsterdam Treaty would 
include a more precise reference to the aim 
of common defence and that the crisis man-
agement tasks would be mentioned as the 
first stage in the development of a common 
defence.
The non-aligned countries opposed the 
proposal. In order not to compromise their 
status as militarily non-aligned countries, 
they wanted to keep common defence out of 
the EU.24 To this end, they tried to direct the 
European discussions on the EU’s defence 
policy towards crisis management instead of 
mutual security guarantees and other similar 
issues that were considered difficult to dove-
tail with their national policies and foreign 
and security policy traditions.25
Together with Sweden, Finland proposed 
a compromise which consisted of the inclu-
sion of the Petersberg tasks26 in the Amster-
dam Treaty and the CFSP. In this way, instead 
of merging WEU with the EU, WEU would 
become an EU instrument for carrying out 
military crisis management operations. Fin-
land and Sweden’s initiative (The IGC and the 
Security and Defence Dimension: Towards 
an Enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management. 
Memorandum from Finland and Sweden, 25 
April 1996) proposed that humanitarian and 
crisis management tasks in which military 
organizations are used would be added to 
the EU’s competences.27 The memorandum 
was adopted, and the Petersberg tasks were 
transferred to the EU, but WEU’s territorial 
defence mission fell outside the arrangement 
as Finland and Sweden had wished. Mili-
tary crisis management tasks were included 
24 Ojanen 2007, 36.
25 Tiilikainen 2007, 178.
26 The Petersberg tasks comprise humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks carried 
out by combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making. 
27 Government Report 1/1997, 17.
in the EU’s competences in the Amsterdam 
Treaty and crisis management became part of 
the CFSP.28
The “uploading” of national goals was 
successful in the sense that a line between 
crisis management and defence was drawn, 
and the worst scenario for Finland – the 
merger of WEU with the EU, and the incor-
poration of the WEU defence clause into the 
EU treaties – was not realized. Thus it was 
possible for Finland to argue that the devel-
opment of the EU’s defence dimension actu-
ally meant strengthening crisis management 
and peacekeeping activities. With defence 
taken out of the defence dimension, the CFSP 
was more suited to Finland’s self-image as 
a non-aligned country with a tradition of 
peacekeeping. Additionally, it implied that 
Finland was able to participate fully in the 
CFSP. Indeed, the initiative was also pre-
sented as evidence of Finland’s readiness to 
participate constructively in the EU’s secu-
rity cooperation.29
However, Finland and Sweden did not 
achieve all of their goals with their joint initi-
ative. The EU’s Petersberg task list was even-
tually formed on the basis of the WEU’s Pe-
tersberg declaration, and thus included more 
far-reaching capacities than those included 
in the Finnish-Swedish initiative. The Am-
sterdam Treaty refers to the “tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management including peace-
making” instead of “crisis management”, as 
proposed by Finland and Sweden.30 Thus the 
initiative was only partially successful. It 
failed to limit crisis management to some-
thing short of peace enforcement.31
There were also some unintended side ef-
fects that were out of line with the original 
aims of the Finnish-Swedish initiative: At the 
EU level, the initiative, together with the in-
clusion of the Petersberg tasks, was followed 
by a surprisingly rapid development of the 
European security and defence policy. After 
the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, a com-
mon understanding between France and the 
UK was achieved in St. Malo in 1998, which 
28 Sjursen 1998, 107; Tiilikainen 2007, 178.
29 Prime Minister Lipponen 17.3.1997, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 1/1997.
30 Tiilikainen 2007, 178-179.
31 Haukkala & Ojanen 2011.
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added momentum to the EU security and de-
fence policy. Consequently, Finland became 
inextricably entangled in deepening integra-
tion in the area of security and defence policy. 
What enhanced that effect was that many of 
the decisions on ESDP development coincid-
ed with the Finnish EU Council presidency in 
the latter half of 1999. As a result, the task of 
continuing the development of EU military 
crisis management fell to Finland during its 
presidency. To this end, the aim concerning 
the military capacities came to be known as 
the Helsinki Headline Goal.32 
32 It implied that in terms of military capabilities the 
EU should be able, by the year 2003, to deploy within 
sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, a rapid 
reaction force of up to 60,000 persons.
IV 
EU SECURITY GUARANTEES AND NON-ALIGNMENT
17
The development of the common secu-rity and defence policy was back on the Intergovernmental Conference agenda 
again in 2003–2004. The European Conven-
tion on the future of the European Union 
(2002–2003) drew up a proposal for a Euro-
pean Constitution that served as a starting 
point for the Intergovernmental Conference. 
The proposal contained a solidarity clause 
and a mutual defence clause. 
Finland convened a meeting with the oth-
er non-aligned countries, Austria, Ireland 
and Sweden, to formulate a common stand 
on the issue. They objected to the so-called 
structural cooperation and a mutual defence 
clause within the EU and proposed a less au-
tomatic and more voluntary formulation for 
the common defence clause: “If a member 
state is a victim of armed aggression, it may 
request that the other member states give it 
aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, military or other, in accordance with 
Art. 51 of the U.N. Charter”.33 The four foreign 
ministers stated that “provisions containing 
formal binding security guarantees would be 
inconsistent with our security policy or with 
our constitutional requirements”.34
The Finnish Government Report on the 
outcome of the work of the European Con-
vention and on preparations for the Inter-
governmental Conference (Government Re-
port 2/2003) found that writing the common 
defence clause into the Constitutional Treaty 
was not in the Finnish interest. This view was 
supported by the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
which noted that the mutual defence clause 
would mean incorporating an element that is 
typical of defence alliances into the EU.35 This 
argument was also put forward in the parlia-
mentary debate.36 A number of MPs pointed 
to the perceived incompatibility of mutual 
defence and military non-alignment. In their 
view, Finland’s response should build on 
Finland’s non-alignment and the country 
33 Letter by Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden to 
the IGC, 5 December 2003. Emphasis added.
34 Letter by Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden to 
the IGC of 5 December.
35 Foreign Affairs Committee Report 4/2003.
36 MP Siimes 1.10.2003, follow-up debate on 
Government Report 2/2003, Foreign Affairs 
Committee Report 4/2003.
should act together with Sweden and the 
other non-aligned member states.37 
However, the non-aligned countries’ 
proposal was not accepted in the Intergov-
ernmental Conference. Instead, the Treaty 
text came to state that the member states had 
an obligation to provide aid and assistance by 
all the means in their power, and included 
a reference that can be seen to point to the 
neutral and non-aligned countries: “this 
shall not prejudice the specific character of 
the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States” (Article I-41, paragraph 
7).38 Eventually, the security and defence 
policy development included in the Consti-
tutional Treaty was welcomed in Finland by 
the Government, the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee and the Defence Committee. They em-
phasized in the domestic debate that the EU 
is not a military alliance but rather “a unique 
international actor” possessing a wide range 
of tools for tackling the current new security 
threats.39 The Defence Committee shared the 
Government’s view insomuch as it consid-
ered that the EU could not be regarded as a 
military alliance, since no decision had been 
made concerning the EU member states en-
tering into common defence.40 
Yet, the parliamentary debate questioned 
how the solidarity clause and the mutual 
defence clause would affect Finland’s non-
alignment.41 Finally, parliament voted on the 
interpretation of Finnish non-alignment. In 
contrast to the Government Report, the main 
opposition party (the National Coalition Par-
ty, Kokoomus) proposed that since Finland is 
committed to the EU and the solidarity clause 
and security guarantees, Finland cannot be 
considered a militarily non-aligned country 
in the traditional sense. 42 MPs supported 
the proposal, while 149 voted against it and 
37 E.g. MP Kauppila 3.9.2003, preliminary debate on 
Government Report 2/2003.
38 Van Eekelen 2006, 170; Ojanen 2007 37-38.
39 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up 
debate on Government Report 6/2004.
40 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 20; see also 
e.g. MP Lankia 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on 
Government Report 6/2004.
41 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 4/2004, 
11; MP Katainen 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on 
Government Report 6/2004, Defence Committee 
Report 1/2004, 20.
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thus supported the Government Report and 
its interpretation of non-alignment (Plenary 
session of parliament 21.12.2004).
However, the Government’s interpre-
tation also implied a reconstructed non-
alignment concept. The Government stated 
that Finland maintains and develops its 
defence capability as a militarily non-allied 
country and monitors the changes in its se-
curity environment.42 Thus the definition of 
non-alignment became narrower – the term 
referred only to the way in which Finland or-
ganizes its defence: “Finland is not a member 
of any military alliance, and thus develops 
its own national defence as a non-aligned 
country”.43
The Prime Minister emphasized that mili-
tary non-alignment did not describe Finn-
ish foreign policy in any broader sense than 
that.44 The Foreign Minister added that mili-
tary non-alignment was “merely a techni-
cal statement, not a manifesto”.45 As an MP 
summarized in the parliamentary debate, the 
view was that since Finland is not a member 
of NATO, this makes Finland militarily non-
aligned, whereas EU membership implies 
that Finland is politically and economically 
aligned.46 The new definition of non-align-
ment can be taken as a clear indicator of Eu-
ropeanization. It is a question of the relaxa-
tion of national policy positions in order to 
accommodate the progress of the EU policy 
and institutions. 
In the end, the outcomes of both of the 
above-described cases, in which Finland 
tried to upload its goals to the EU, show that 
national projection is not fully steerable 
and might result in unexpected and even 
unwant ed results. This might be a feature 
that concerns only the small member states, 
but what perhaps speaks in favour of the 
generalization of this finding is that in both 
cases Finland worked together with a group 
of member states. Despite the unintended 
42 Government Report 6/2004.
43 Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 6/2004.
44 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up 
debate on Government Report 6/2004.
45 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 29.9.2004, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 6/2004.
46 MP Ranta-Muotio 20.12.2004, follow-up debate 
on Government Report 6/2004.
outcomes, however, the Petersberg tasks are 
generally remembered as a positive sign of 
Finland’s activism in EU crisis management 
policy. In some other, less defence-policy-
oriented CFSP issues, Finnish uploading has 
been more successful: the Northern Dimen-
sion is often presented as a prime example 
of the effective exporting of Finnish foreign 
policy goals to the EU. Currently, peace me-
diation and Arctic policies are issues in which 
there are signs of Finnish attempts at the 
projection of nationally defined policy ideas 
to the EU level.47 
As a result of these European and domes-
tic changes and debates, the CFSP became 
a more internalized element of the national 
discourse. Concepts like “European values” 
and “the common European value base” were 
put forward in the domestic debate as factors 
from which the goals of Finnish foreign and 
security policy can be derived. At the same 
time, the perceived overall security policy 
significance of the EU for Finland has grown. 
A strengthening view has emerged in both 
the official documentation and the parlia-
mentary debate according to which, firstly, 
the deepening of integration within the EU 
has increased the stability of Finland’s envi-
rons. Secondly, it is seen that in the changing 
global environment, security threats extend 
beyond national borders and Finland has be-
come more vulnerable to the “new” security 
threats than before. The EU is now regarded 
as being capable of tackling such threats bet-
ter than any other international organiza-
tion. In this respect, Finnish non-alignment 
has been effectively Europeanized. Finland 
no longer finds itself impartial, but part of 
the European “we”.
The Europeanization trend is also evident 
in the 2009 and 2012 Government Reports on 
security and defence policy, and the related 
parliamentary debates. The latest Govern-
ment Report states that it is important for 
Finland that the EU retains its role in preserv-
ing stability in Europe and its significance as 
a security community.48 Membership of the 
EU is designated “a fundamental security 
47 See Government Report 6/2012, 82; Finland’s 
Arctic Strategy 2010, 46-48.
48 Government Report 6/2012, 12.
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policy choice for Finland”.49 The Prime Min-
ister has noted that the development of the 
EU’s common security and defence policy 
has advanced at a slower pace than expected, 
yet there is a greater need for it than before.50 
According to the Foreign Minister, Finland 
is committed to the development of the EU 
security and defence policy.51 The Govern-
ment Report finds that the Lisbon Treaty has 
advanced the common security and defence 
policy and that political commitment to the 
development of capacity cooperation has 
increased.52 Further national adaptation in 
the form of changes to the Finnish legisla-
tion is likely to take place in the near future. 
The Government Report also states that both 
the solidarity clause (concerning terrorist 
attacks and natural and man-made catastro-
phes) and the mutual assistance clause (con-
cerning armed attacks) in the Lisbon Treaty 
call for changes to the Finnish legislation.53 
Both obligations are seen as advancing Fin-
land’s security54, although their functioning 
in practice is in some cases called into ques-
tion in the parliamentary debate.55
It can be concluded that a comprehensive 
reassessment and eventual redefinition of 
the nature of Finnish non-alignment due to 
deepening European integration has taken 
place. The Finnish interpretation of non-
alignment has been made compatible with 
the CSDP, and further adaptation is set to oc-
cur as Finland has declared its commitment 
to the development of a more effective com-
mon security and defence policy.56  Further-
more, Finland advocates the development of 
a common security and defence policy which 
will “facilitate the ability to receive and pro-
vide assistance”.57 However, the adaptational 
pressure exerted by the defence dimension 
of the CSDP has been far from unambiguous 
49 ibid., 76. 
50 Prime Minister Katainen 6.2.2013, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 6/2012.
51 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 6.2.2013, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 6/2012.
52 Government Report 6/2012, 57.
53 Government Report 6/2012, 89-90.
54 Government Report 1/2009, 65.
55 E.g. MP Nepponen, MP Kanerva 16.6.2009, follow-
up debate on Government Report 1/2009.
56 Government Report 6/2012, 78.
57 ibid., 90.
to date. The unclear status of EU defence 
policy has left room for national interpreta-
tion. This has made it possible for Finland to 
gradually redefine the meaning of military 
non-alignment. Currently, the official policy 
documents take the line that “Finland is not 
a member of a military alliance”.58
58 E.g. Government Report 6/2012, 78.
V 
EU OPERATIONS AND BATTLE GROUPS: 
FROM PEACEKEEPING TO  
MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT
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The Finnish peacekeeping legislation has been amended four times since EU accession in 1995, and currently refers 
to crisis management instead of peacekeep-
ing in its title. The restrictions concerning 
the rules of engagement and the need for a 
United Nations mandate have been loosened. 
The transition from conventional peacekeep-
ing towards military crisis management be-
gan in the context of Finnish participation 
in the NATO-led operations of IFOR, SFOR 
and KFOR in the Balkans in the 1990s.59 The 
EU military crisis management operations 
started with the Concordia operation in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 
March 2003. Finland also participated in the 
Althea operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in December 2004.60
In the parliamentary debate, these opera-
tions were perceived as a sign and example of 
new and deeper cooperation in EU security 
and defence policy. As it was understood that 
Concordia would be followed by other EU 
crisis management operations, a view gain-
ing ground was that amending the national 
peacekeeping legislation was inevitable. Ad-
ditional pressure in that direction was ex-
erted by the plans concerning the EU battle 
groups – it was decided that Finland would 
take part in two battle groups in 2007 and 
2008.61 
Both the EU crisis management opera-
tions and the battle groups were a signifi-
cant source of Europeanization. The Prime 
Minister drew a clear connection between 
EU crisis management and the battle groups 
and the need to amend Finnish peacekeeping 
legislation so that Finland could participate 
in them.62 This argumentation was widely 
employed in different official documenta-
tion related to the legislation process63, and 
59 Palosaari 2013.
60 The Finnish troop contribution in Concordia was 9 
participants, and in Althea c. 200 participants.
61 Government Report 8/2006, Government Report 
2/2007.
62 Prime Minister Vanhanen 28.9.2004, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 6/2004.  
63 See Rauhanturvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän 
mietintö 2005 [Memorandum by the working group 
on the amending of the peacekeeping legislation], 
Defence Committee Report 1/2004, Government 
proposal 110/2005, Government proposal 5/2006.
EU crisis management was also frequently 
presented in the parliamentary debate as 
the main reason for amending the peace-
keeping legislation.64 It was also considered 
that since “military crisis management” as a 
term describes the EU’s crisis management 
tasks better than the term “peacekeeping”, it 
makes sense to change the title of the Finnish 
law so that instead of peacekeeping it refers to 
military crisis management (the official title 
being Act on Military Crisis Management).65
The definition of crisis management relies 
heavily on the definitions provided by the 
EU. The Defence Committee, for instance, 
finds that the EU possesses unique civil and 
military capabilities for intervening in cri-
ses.66 The EU policies clearly influence the 
way peacekeeping was reconceptualized. A 
typical conclusion was that the Finnish ap-
proach to crisis management must be com-
patible with those of the other EU members, 
so that Finland can participate on equal terms 
in preparations and the implementation of 
forthcoming tasks and missions.67 Further-
more, it was seen that when Finland takes 
part in EU battle groups and operations, as 
well as in other multinational crisis manage-
ment constellations, Finnish troops must 
adhere to similar rules regarding the use of 
force as other participating nations.
The national procedures and decision-
making structures were revised so that the 
mobilization of a rapid response force geared 
to the needs of EU operations and battle 
groups would become possible. The EU bat-
tle group concept required a new kind of 
64 E.g. MP Lehti 20.12.2004, follow-up debate 
on Government Report 6/2004; MP Siimes, MP 
Jaakonsaari, 14.9.2005, preliminary debate on 
Government proposal 110/2005; MP Kekkonen 
21.2.2006, preliminary debate on Government 
proposal 5/2006.
65 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30; 
Rauhanturvaamislain uudistamistyöryhmän mietintö 
2005 [Memorandum by the working group on the 
amending of the peacekeeping legislation].
66 Defence Committee Statement 8/2005.
67 Foreign Minister Tuomioja 21.2.2006, preliminary 
debate on Government proposal 5/2006; see also 
Government proposal 5/2006, 19-20 on the crisis 
management legislation of some other EU member 
states.
22
 preparedness from the Defence Forces as well 
as more flexible national decision-making.
Pressure existed when it came to imple-
menting the legislative and other changes 
due to the need to get the EU battle groups 
ready for deployment and for being on call at 
the beginning of 2007. Time was also needed 
for national recruitment and agreeing on the 
conditions of employment. External time 
pressures dictated the schedule of the whole 
legislatory process from preparatory work to 
parliament and committee handling.68 
Another issue widely discussed in the par-
liamentary debates on the peacekeeping leg-
islation concerned the matter of a UN man-
date, as the EU’s guidelines do not require an 
absolute UN Security Council mandate for its 
operations. The necessity for a UN mandate 
was duly called into question in the domestic 
debate.
The Defence Committee saw that it might 
be impossible to obtain the UN Security 
Council’s mandate for the deployment of the 
EU’s rapid response force in every case, for 
instance due to the urgency of an operation 
or a conflict of interest between perma-
nent members of the Security Council. Yet, 
it found it inconceivable that the EU would 
use force contrary to the principles of the 
UN Charter.69 The Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee pointed out that the European Security 
Strategy and the Treaty on European Union 
both refer to the UN Charter. Therefore it was 
also seen that the EU rapid response forces 
support UN crisis management.70 This con-
clusion was opposed by views according to 
which a UN mandate should be obtained for 
all EU operations because otherwise the UN’s 
prestige and ability to function in the future 
would be undermined. Furthermore, it was 
argued that without the UN mandate, the 
EU’s crisis management operations would 
erode international justice and undermine 
the EU’s status as a promoter of justice.71
68 Prime Minister Vanhanen 20.12.2004, follow-up 
debate on Government Report 6/2004.
69 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 30.
70 Foreign Affairs Committee Statement 1/2006, 8.
71 E.g. MP Siimes 28.9.2004, preliminary debate on 
Government Report 6/2004. Initially, the President 
also supported keeping the UN mandate.
In the end, EU crisis management was cit-
ed as a key reason when the national restric-
tions on participating in international crisis 
management (UN mandate and limitations 
as to the use of force) were relinquished. The 
aim was to get rid of any national precondi-
tions that would hinder Finnish participation 
in the EU rapid action operations and crisis 
management. The government referred di-
rectly to Article 42 of the UN Charter and how 
it could be problematic for Finnish “partici-
pation in the EU rapid action forces and the 
full scale of the Petersberg tasks”.72
The traditional UN peacekeeping and na-
tional restrictions on the use of force were 
previously seen as appropriate for a neutral 
small state. This view has since been Euro-
peanized: these features should be removed 
so that Finland can be similar to the other EU 
members when it comes to crisis manage-
ment.73 The dominant conceptualizations of 
peacekeeping traditions, a small state’s role 
in peacekeeping and the self-perception of 
a peacekeeping superpower were now open 
to reinterpretation.74 The meanings attached 
to them were no longer that fixed, and all 
these issues were utilized in different ways in 
the domestic political argumentation. They 
were, for instance, used both in supporting 
and opposing Finnish participation in EU 
military crisis management.
Similarly, military crisis management 
can be presented on the one hand as a logi-
cal continuation of Finnish peacekeeping 
traditions, and as a break with tradition on 
the other. The Defence Minister, for instance, 
saw the new legislation on both civil and 
military crisis management as a continuation 
of five decades of Finnish peacekeeping – 
traditional missions continue while civil and 
military crisis management offer new tools 
72 Government proposal 5/2006, 23.
73 E.g. MP Nepponen 15.3.2006, debate on 
Government proposal 5/2006 (first reading), 
14.9.2005, preliminary debate on Government 
proposal 110/2005.
74 For instance, MP Hakola opined that in the 
light of the number of Finnish international 
crisis management troops, Finland is no longer a 
peacekeeping superpower. MP Hakola, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 8/2010.
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 to  respond to more demanding crises.75 Con-
sequently, participation in the development 
of crisis management, rapid response and 
the EU battle groups was seen to be compat-
ible with Finnish peacekeeping traditions.76 
Yet, the Defence Committee admitted that 
“participation in the rapid response force is 
a significant change in the practical imple-
mentation of Finland’s international crisis 
management”.77
Similar tendencies appear in the domestic 
debate on the EU battle groups. Finland was 
on stand-by in these battle groups for a six-
month period in 2007, 2008 and 2011. So far, 
the battle groups have not been deployed. 
The official view is that Finland “continues 
to participate in EUBGs and supports an in-
crease in their capacity and deployability”.78 
In the parliamentary debate, Finnish par-
ticipation in the battle groups has often been 
seen as a continuation of Finnish peacekeep-
ing tradition. Nonetheless, the potential con-
tradiction between the resources committed 
to EU battle groups versus UN operations has 
also been debated.
The question has arisen as to whether the 
battle groups take resources away from UN 
operations, especially as they  have not been 
deployed.79 The dominant view is that par-
ticipation in the EU battle groups supports 
national defence, although conflicting opin-
ions also surface in the debate.80 The positive 
experiences resulting from cooperation with 
Nordic, non-aligned and NATO countries in 
the battle groups have also been highlighted 
in the parliamentary debate.81
75 Defence Minister Kääriäinen 14.9.2005, preliminary 
debate on Government proposal 110/2005.
76 MP Lankia 20.12.2004, follow-up debate on 
Government Report 6/2004, MP Ollila 13.11.2007, 
preliminary debate on Government Report 2/2007; 
MP Kekkonen 21.2.2006, preliminary debate on 
Government proposal 5/2006.
77 Defence Committee Report 1/2004, 29.
78 Government Report 6/2012, 13.
79 MP Kallio, MP Laakso 24.11.2010, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 8/2010.
80 MP Korkeaoja, MP Haavisto, MP Kiljunen, 
Defence Minister Häkämies, MP Oinonen 24.11.2010, 
preliminary debate on Government Report 8/2010.
81 MP Blomqvist, MP Palm, 24.11.2010, preliminary 
debate on Government Report 8/2010.
VI 
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Since Finland’s accession, the Govern-ment and parliament have gained more power when it comes to foreign policy-
making in the national decision-making 
system. According to the Constitution which 
entered into force in 2000, the President is 
responsible for traditional foreign policy in 
cooperation with the Government, whereas 
European affairs are the domain of the Gov-
ernment. Although drawing a clear bound-
ary between these two might sometimes be 
difficult, the Constitution clearly transferred 
power in foreign and security policy-making 
from the President to the Prime Minister and 
the Council of State – partly because the ma-
jority of foreign policy issues can be seen to 
have a connection to EU affairs in one way or 
another.
This development was also strengthened 
by the termination of the Defence Council 
[puolustusneuvosto] in 2000 and the transfer 
of its main tasks to the Government’s Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. 
Additionally, the Prime Minister’s position 
has been strengthened in that the EU secre-
tariat responsible for the coordination of EU 
affairs has been relocated from the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister’s 
Office and is now called the Government 
Secretariat for EU Affairs.82 
Nevertheless, questions relating to the di-
vision of power between the Prime Minister 
and the President in the European security 
and defence policy have remained a sensitive 
issue in Finnish domestic politics. EU crisis 
management has been a source of political 
disputes regarding the domestic division of 
power in foreign and security policy. A de-
bated issue has concerned the way in which 
the national decision to deploy EU crisis 
management troops and battle groups should 
be made.
Particularly at the time of the first EU 
crisis management operations, there was 
room for interpretation as to who should 
decide on participation in the operations, 
since it was not entirely clear whether they 
were to be considered “foreign policy” and 
hence the domain of the President, or “EU 
affairs” belonging to the Prime Minister and 
82 Forsberg 2002, Tiilikainen 2007.
the Government.83 In 2006 this resulted in a 
“constitutional crisis” in which parliament 
was divided between those supporting the 
President’s power and those more in favour of 
handing all CSDP decisions over to the Prime 
Minister and the Government.84 The deepen-
ing of European integration in the sphere of 
foreign and security policy was effectively 
turning issues that traditionally belonged 
to the President into “internal” EU affairs, 
and thus transferring them to the domain 
of the Prime Minister and the Government. 
This “Europeanization automation” demon-
strates how Europeanization might result in 
a conflict of authority and change the power 
relationship between the key foreign and se-
curity policy decision-makers.  
The “constitutional crisis” culminated in 
the Government withdrawing its first pro-
posal for the new peacekeeping legislation 
(Government proposal 110/2005 for the Act 
on Military Crisis Management) after the 
Parliament’s Constitutional Law Committee 
Statement, and planning to amend the Con-
stitution instead.85 This came as a surprise to 
many MPs (as well as Finnish constitutional 
law experts86). The new law was passed as a 
so-called exceptive act of permanent na-
ture, based on Government proposal 5/2006, 
which stated that the President would decide 
on Finnish participation in operations on 
the basis of the Government’s proposal, and 
the Government would hear the Parliament 
before making the proposal. Similarly, the 
President would also make the decision on 
placing the EU battle groups in high readiness 
status and sending the troops on a mission. 
All in all, the Common Security and De-
fence Policy has been loaded with many 
politically contentious questions in the do-
mestic debate, such as the preferred roles 
of the UN and the EU in crisis management, 
the interpretation of the constitution, the 
83 MP Sasi, Chair of the Parliament’s Constitutional 
Law Committee 15.3.2006, debate on Government 
proposal 5/2006 (first reading).
84 E.g. MP Siimes, MP Räsänen 21.2.2006, 
preliminary debate on Government proposal 5/2006. 
On the jurisprudential aspects of the issue, see 
Niskanen 2006.
85 Prime Minister Vanhanen 1.12.2005, question 
time: Prime Minister’s position on the Constitution.
86 Edilex 2.12.2005.
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division of power, the parliamentarization 
of foreign and security policy, party poli-
tics, and the President’s traditional position 
as the Commander-in-chief of the Defence 
Forces. Differing interpretations as to whom 
EU affairs and the CFSP belong have emerged 
during the whole Finnish EU-membership 
era, due in large part to the difficulties in 
drawing a line between foreign policy and 
EU affairs.87 From time to time, this ambigu-
ity has materialized as a so-called two-plate 
policy, or dual representation in EU sum-
mits, which means that Finland often sent 
both the President and the Prime Minister to 
European Council meetings.
All this goes to show that although Euro-
pean integration causes pressures for domes-
tic structural change, it is not in a given form 
but, rather, gives rise to national variation 
– and in the Finnish case an obvious national 
political struggle on how the Europeaniza-
tion impact is to be nationally digested and 
implemented.
87 E.g. MP Kankaanniemi, MP Sasi, MP Kiljunen 
21.2.2006, preliminary debate on Government 
proposal 5/2006. Some saw this coming as early as 
the first year of EU membership when Government 
Report 1/1995 was handled in parliament and the 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia were discussed. 
MP Ojala 20.12.1995, MP Wahlström 31.10.1995.
CONCLUSION: 
DRIFTWOOD THEORY 2.0
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This paper has examined Finnish foreign and security policy from the perspec-tive of Europeanization. As the Finnish 
case shows, Europeanization can occur in 
two directions. Firstly, there is the impact 
of European integration on member states, 
which is called national adaptation. This 
means that a member state makes changes 
in response to the demands or expectations 
of the EU. Secondly, the process can also 
take place the other way around. This is the 
so-called bottom-up direction, or national 
projection, and it concerns the impact of the 
member states on the EU. 
The Finnish case highlighted another 
theoretical division that can be drawn based 
on the quality of Europeanization and its 
outcome. Thin Europeanization refers to 
changes in the national structures, policies, 
legislation or division of power. Thin Euro-
peanization is clearly evident in the Finn-
ish case as the structural changes and the 
“Europeanization automation” presented 
above indicate. However, the Europeaniza-
tion of foreign policy can go beyond bureau-
cratic reorganization, constitutional change, 
structural adaptation and other rationalist 
forms of change. Indeed, the Finnish case 
aptly illustrated what thick Europeanization 
means: changes in the domestic understand-
ings, interests and identities.88 The adapta-
tional pressure exerted by the EU has played 
a key role in redefining Finnish non-align-
ment and peacekeeping/crisis management. 
The small state identity has been replaced 
by a small member state identity – and the 
understanding of foreign and security policy 
interests has changed accordingly. The CFSP 
has indeed functioned as a “critical sociolog-
ical force and venue that shapes perceptions” 
among member states.89
The (in)famous driftwood theory of 
Finnish foreign policy has been effectively 
debunked, discredited and dismissed by 
contemporary historians. According to this 
theory, Finland was portrayed as a piece of 
floating driftwood in the torrent of world 
politics, with no control over events. In the 
parliamentary debates from the early 1990s 
88 For a refined model of foreign policy 
Europeanization, see Palosaari 2011, 34-38.
89 Wong 2007, 382.
to this day a common view emerges accord-
ing to which Finland is no longer a solitary 
log or a single piece of driftwood shooting the 
rapids of world politics in isolation. Rather, 
there appears to be a common understanding 
that Finland is tied to a raft of logs – a Euro-
pean raft – floating in unison, and therefore 
more steadily and calmly, as the mass of the 
common raft cushions and softens the blows 
and collisions. 
However, what is debated is how tightly 
Finland should be tied to the European raft. 
Should Finland remain on the outer rim, or 
should Finland aim to be at the centre of the 
raft? Moreover, does Finland possess any 
boat hook or pole with which to steer the 
raft? Or is the implication that once you are 
an integrated part of the raft, you can only go 
where it takes you? 
What is also noteworthy in this new Finn-
ish foreign policy debate is that there appears 
to be an ongoing trend of “post-consensus”, 
brought about by the simultaneous parlia-
mentarization and Europeanization of for-
eign and security policy. Foreign and security 
policy is more openly discussed in parlia-
ment, and parliament has more say in deci-
sion-making. Furthermore, EU membership 
has brought with it a diversified policy agen-
da and new levels of decision-making. This 
has made the preconditions for national con-
sensus more complicated and has resulted in 
diversification in the domestic discourse and 
a gradual fracturing of consensus. 
Furthermore, the “small state identity” 
has begun to be increasingly interpreted as 
a “small member state identity”. There is 
a growing perception that it is in the for-
eign and security policy interests of a small 
member state to promote the EU as a strong 
international actor. At the same time, the 
understanding of a legitimate security inter-
est of a small state that rests on purely na-
tionally defined security interests has been 
challenged by a view that sees foreign and 
security policy interests as common and de-
fined in common European processes. Small 
stateness is increasingly perceived to imply 
supporting the external capacity of the EU, 
and common European security and defence 
policy. 
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